Flight performance of Skylab attitude and pointing control system by Kennel, H. F. et al.
NASA TECHNICAL NOTE NASA TN 0-8003 
M 
0 
d 
FLIGHT PERFORMANCE OF SKYLAB ATTITUDE 
AND POINTING CONTROL SYSTEM 
W. B. Chubb, H. F. Kennel, C. C. Rupp, 
and  S. M .  Seltzer 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Ala. 35812 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D. C. JUNE 1975 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19750016749 2020-03-22T21:55:11+00:00Z
TECHNICAL REPORT STANDARD TITLE PAGE 
NASA TN D-8003 
Flight Performance of Skylab Attitude and Pointing Control System 
I 
14. T I T L E  AND SUBTITLE 5 .  REPORT DATE 
Jum 1975 
6. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION CODE 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35812 
't3, TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED 
12. SPONSORING AGENCY NAME AWD ADDRESS 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, D. C. 20546 
Technical Note 
14. SPONSORING AGENCY CODE 
I 
15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
1s. ABSTRACT I 
This note briefly reviews the Skylab attitude and pointing control system (APCS) requirements and the 
way in which they became altered during the prelaunch phase of development. The actual flight mission 
(including mission alterations during flight) is described. The serious hardware failures that occurred, 
beginning during ascent through the atmosphere, also are described. The APCS's ability to overcome these 
failures and meet mission changes are presented. The large around-the-clock support effort on the ground is 
discussed. Finally, salient design points and software flexibility that should afford pertinent experience for 
future spacecraft attitude and pointing control system designs are included. 
I 
Unclassified - Unlimited E 1 
Cat 18 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the significa 
and support of the APCS by numerous other NASA 
, IBM, Martin Marietta Corp., McDonnell Do 
SABLE Of CONTENTS 
Page 
I. ~ ~ T ~ O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  . . . . . . . . . , - . . . . . . . , . . . , I 
EX, INITIALDESIGN , . . . . . . . . . . e . , - . . . . . . . . 1 
A. FreeFIybgATM. , . . , . . . , . . . . . . . , . , . . 1 
B. WACSDevdopxnent . . . . . . a . . . * . . . . . . . . . 2 
C. Wet Warksbp , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , 2 
E). Requirements . . . , . . . . - . . . . . . , . . . , . . 2 
81 ,  FINAL DESIGN , . . . 1 . . . , . . , . . I . . I . . . , . . 2 
* 
A. EvolutkmofFi7zaZrlesign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
8. SystemDescriptiion . , , . , . . . . . . . e . . . 5 
IV. OPlERATION . . . I . , . I . , - . I . . .. r ' .  f . . . 1 , . 2 1  , 
A. Mission and Peri'ommce Description . . . , . * _. I . . . . I) * 11 
€3. Major Variations from Expected Operatiom, . . . . . . . . . . - I3 
C. lrnpravementslLesscms Learned . . . , . , . . . . . . . . , . 20 
W, REFERENCES . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
LIST QF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure Title Page 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Table 
1. 
2. 
Skylab cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 
APCS block diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 . 
CMG orientations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
Jitter caused by crew motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 
Attitude error jitter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 
LtST OF TABLES 
Title Page 
APCS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 
Pointing Accuracy Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
iv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Apcs 
ASCO 
ATM 
ATMDC 
ASS 
C&D 
CMG 
CMGIA 
CSM 
DAS/DCS 
EPCS 
EPEA 
EREP 
EVA 
FOMR 
FSS 
GNS 
HO SC 
JSC 
LM 
MIB 
MLU 
MOPS 
MPC 
Attitude and Pointing Control System 
ATMDC Software Control Officer 
Apollo Telescope Mount 
ATM Digital Computer 
Acquisition Sun Sensor 
Control and Display 
Control Moment Gyroscope 
CMG Input Assembly 
Command and Service Module 
Digital Address System/Digital Command System 
Experiment Pointing Control System 
Experiment Pointing Electronic Assembly 
Earth Resources Experiment Package 
Extravehicular Activity 
Flight Operations Mission Room 
Fine Sun Sensors 
SWS Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Engineer 
Huntsville Operations Support Center 
Johnson Space Center 
Lunar Module 
Minimum Impulse Bit 
Memory Load Unit 
Mission Operations Planning System (JSC) 
Manual Pointing Controller 
V 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Concluded) 
OD 
OMSF 
ows 
PCS 
Rack 
RAPS. 
RCS 
RF 
RG 
RGP 
RPM 
SI 
STAC 
TACS 
TV 
UP/DN 
WACS 
WCIU 
2-LV 
Operations Director 
Office of Manned Space Flight 
Orbital Workshop 
Pointing Control System 
Canister Support Structure 
Real-Time Astrionics Problem Solving 
Reaction Control System 
Radio Frequency 
Rate Gyro 
Rate Gyro Package 
Roll Position Mechanism 
Solar Inertial 
Support Team for Attitude Control 
Thruster Attitude Control System 
Television 
Up /D o w n 
Workshop Attitude' Control System 
Workshop Computer Interface Unit 
2-Local Vertical 
vi 
FLIGHT PERFORMANCE OF S K ~ L A B  ATTITUDE AND POINTING 
CONTROL SYSTEM 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
In 1967 a paper presented at the AIAA Guidance, Control, and Flight Dynamics 
Conference in Huntsville, Alabama, revealed for the first time the proposed Skylab attitude 
and pointing control system (APCS) [ 11. The system requirements, Apollo Telescope Mount 
(ATM) configuration, control philosophy, and operational modes were presented and the 
APCS was described. The initial mission and system design requirements changed during the 
period of time before the Skylab was launched. This note reviews the initial and final APCS 
requirements and goals and their relationship [ 2-1 1 1. The actual flight mission (and its 
alterations during the flight) and the APCS performance achieved is also presented. 
Skylab was a tremendous success in furthering man’s scientific knowledge, but perhaps 
Skylab will be remembered more for the anomalies and the efforts undertaken to solve them. 
On May 14, 1973, the unmanned Skylab orbital workshop was launched from Kennedy Space 
Center. Serious hardware failures began to occur during ascent through the atmosphere, and 
their spectre continued to haunt both the astronauts and the ground-based support team. 
However, these were not the only surprises affecting the design and operation of the APCS. 
Mission requirements for pointing to various stellar targets and to nadir for Earth resources 
experiments were added after the hardware was designed. The chance appearance of comet 
Kohoutek during the Skylab operational lifetime caused NASA to add comet observation to 
the mission requirements and to adjust the time when the third crew would man the Skylab. 
The development of new procedures and software for the opportunity to observe this visitor to 
our solar system is described. 
I I .  INITIAL DESIGN 
The design of the Skylab APCS was based on evolving ground rules and directives for 
the ATM pointing control system (PCS) dating from June 1966. Prior to that time, various 
proposals and control moment gyroscope (CMG) systems had been studied. Ground rules set 
forth in response to directives from the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) were included 
in a preliminary design review in July 1966. Three separate stages of development - the free 
flying ATM, the workshop attitude control system (WACS), and the wet workshop - 
characterized the initial design. 
A. Free Flying ATM 
The PCS ground rules provided for a design using a command and service module 
(CSM) docked to a modified lunar module (LM) housing solar experiments, a 28day maximum 
life, no redundancy, and a 1968 launch. The PCS design (1 966) consisted of a fine and coarse 
sun sensor, a single analog control computer with switching and logic, three double ghbaled 
WGs, CMG electronics and inverters, thee  rate gyroscopes, a hand controller, and andog 
meters. T h i s  system depended on the CSM reaction control system (RCS) for manual 
desaturation of CMG angular momentum and visual pointing of the experiments. 
8. WACS Development 
The first major design impact occurred when the ATM vehicle was clustered with m 
SlW stage modified as the astronauts’ living quarters. 
The necessity for a major new operational capability, unmanned rendezvous and 
docking, and provision for attitude stabilization during the manned and storage pefiodsprior 
to the ATM docking required the development of the WACS, for controlling the OWS, in 
addition to the PCS, for controlling the ATM. The WACS was to be activated following S-IVB 
stage passivation (removal of residual fuel, etc.). Astronaut commands or ground commands 
selected the WACS control modes and the necessary control phases. Follow&g PCS activation 
the WACS would be placed in a minimum power consumption conditiun and could be 
re-energized as required. After the flight crew docked the CSM to the S4V3 stage, its RCS 
would be turned on to maneuver the cluster to the ATM acquisition attitude. Control of the 
cluster would then be assumed by the PCS. 
C. Wet Workshop 
By June 1969, the WACS had evolved to a system consisting of rgte gyros (RGs), 
discrete horizon sensors, conical scan harizan sensors and processing efectrofiics, sun sensors, 
control computer, control switching assemblies, thrusters, and a control and display (C&D) 
panel. Redundant components and citcuitry were provided to meet crew safety and mission 
success criteria [ 103 . 
D. Requirements 
The initial (1 967) requirements (subsequently changed) are shown in Table 1 [ 1 J . 
!!I. FINAL DESIGN 
A. Evolution of Final Design 
Clustering the ATM to the Orbital Workshop (OW S) imposed additional requirements 
on the PCS. Increased CMG momentum was required due to increased vehicle 
moments-of-inertia. To significantly reduce gravity gradient bias torques, the veGcle’s 
principal axis of minimum moment-of-inertia had to be constrained to lie as cfosely as possible 
to the orbital plane while the ATM experiment package (canister) was pointed toward the Sun. 
Since this constrained the vehicle attitude about the lhe-of-sight to the Sun, a roll positioning 
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capability of I 1  20 deg was added to the canister. To preclude CMG saturation, the LM and 
CSM RCSs would be used to desaturate excess momentum. At .the same time, experiment 
demands and crew motion combined to require a decoupled experiment package mounting 
with autonomous controls because it was realized that man-motion disturbances would tax the 
capability of the CMG system to maintain the experiment pointing stability requirements. This 
isolation between the canister and its mounting structure was provided by a 2 deg-of-freedom 
gimbal system using frictionless compensated flex-pivots. These were designed to allow +2 deg 
of rotation about the experiment pointing control system (EPCS) X- and Y-axis. Because 
these impacts, combined with increased readout needs and the addition of a star tracker 
reference, added to the complexity of the analog control computer, a seperate electronics 
box, equivalent to a small digital computer, was proposed. 
During the daylight portion of the orbit, the cluster X and Y attitude errors were sensed 
by the acquisition sun sensor (ASS). Differentiating the ASS outputs provided the necessary 
rate damping. During the night when the experiment pointing package was caged, the 
integrated canister RGs outputs were used to obtain attitude error information. Because of the 
canister roll capability, resolvers were provided to transform the gyro rates to the CMG control 
system coordinate system. X-axis attitude errors for the cluster were obtained by integrating 
the vehicle-mounted X-axis RG. 
Attitude error signals for the EPCS were derived from the fine sun sensors (FSSs), and 
rate damping was provided by the canister-mounted RGs. The experiment package offset 
capability for each axis was developed by controlling the FSS optical wedges. An analog 
computer was used to implement the then-considered CMG H-vector control law, the CMG 
steering law, and the EPCS and CMG control error processing. 
Reliability considerations for long-duration mission times caused designers to take a 
new look at redundancy. All mission-critical single-point failures were made redundant by 
introducing a switchover capability into the added duplex components. To accomplish this, 
additional rate gyros were added to the canister support structure (rack), obviating the need for 
the coordinate transformation resolver. Sensor averaging was implemented later. Extensive 
investigations showed that a digital (rather than analog) computer reduced the system 
complexity. To minimize the CSM and cluster fuel requirements, a CMG momentum 
desaturation scheme was instituted which utilized vehicle maneuvers against the gravitational 
field during the night portion of the orbit [8]. 
It was recognized that if the launch stack could accommodate the ATM, the program 
would be greatly simplified by eliminating extensive program and technical requirements. The 
capability to reduce program cost and complexity by eliminating the ATM as a free-flying 
module, the ability to rapidly activate the workshop by preinstallation and checkout prior 
to launch, and the capability to significantly expand the mission potential with the weight 
margins offered by a Saturn V launch vehicle supplied the rationale for conversion from a 
wet to a dry workshop. 
The PCS and WACS were designed to operate autonomously during separate mission 
phases; however, the wet-to-dry conversion made it desirable to unite the two systems. This 
new system was renamed the APCS. Because of more ample weight margins the WACS was 
replaced by a simpler blowdown cold-gas thruster attitude control system (TACS). 
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The role of the digital computer was increased, and the ATM control computer was 
displaced. The CMG control law, error processing, and the bending mode filtering were to be 
performed in a digital fashion. The EPCS portion of the analog control computer was retained 
and assembled in a new unit called the experiment pointing electronic assembly (EPEA). The 
new mission requirements obviated the need for an LM; consequently, this module was 
eliminated. 
The vehicle moments of inertia had increased almost 1 0-fold since the size of the CMG 
momentum had been selected and only an increase in momentum management sophistication 
prevented a need for a much earlier CMG momentum increase. The two-CMG operation had 
become extremely marginal (80 percent of the total momentum was needed for the 
accommodation of the cyclic torques alone; the remainder was incapable of handling the bias 
momentum accumulation and the maneuvers). Therefore, the CMG wheel speed was increased 
by 14 percent (this was the only possible way to increase momentum without a structural 
redesign), still leaving the CMG system somewhat marginal. 
By 197 1 the system requirements had been altered and had been divided into CMG PCS 
requirements and EPCS requirements (Table 1 {[ 91 . Z-local vertical (Z-LV) requirements were 
added also. The requirements for the Z-LV mode of operation (e.g., during Earth resources 
experiments) are the same as those shown later in Table 2 except that a navigation error of +2 
deg is acceptable. 
B. System Description 
1 .  Introduction. The cluster and its associated control axes are shown in Figure 1. 
The APCS provides three-axis attitude stabilization and maneuvering capability for the vehicle 
throughout the mission and for pointing control of the Skylab experiment package. 
To summarize, the APCS consisted of two separate control systems. The PCS provided 
the attitude stabilization and maneuvering capability for the vehicle. The EPCS provided 
pointing control of the ATM experiment canister and allowed offset pointing to targets of 
opportunity on the solar disk. 
The major sections of the APCS, shown in Figure 2 are: ATM rate gyros, ATM ASS, star 
tracker, ATM digital computer (ATMDC) and workshop computer interface unit (WCIU), 
memory load unit (MLU), double-gimbaled CMGs, cold gas TACS, and the EPCS. 
The following six control modes were addressable by C&D console switches and the 
digital address system/digital command system (DAS/DCS) for APCS operation: 
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1. Standby -This mode was used when no attitude control was required of the APCS. 
While in the standby mode, the CMG gimbal rate commands for attitude control were zeroed, 
and no firing commands were issued to the TACS. 
2. Solar Inertial (SI) - This mode was used during experiment periods and for 
momentum dumping. The prevalent attitude during the daytime was with the cluster Z-axis 
pointing toward the Sun. Vehicle control was maintained through the CMGlTACS control 
systems. 
3. Experiment Pointing - This mode was identical to the day portion of the SI mode 
with respect to vehicle control. In this mode, however, the EPCS was activated. 
4. Attitude Hold/CMG - This mode required that the vehicle be held in an inertial 
attitude; all control torques were furnished by the CMG system utilizing TACS for necessary 
momentum desaturation. 
5. Attitude Hold/TACS - This mode required that the vehicle be held inertially 
stable, with control torques furnished by the TACS. 
6. Z-LV - This mode was designed to be used during the rendezvous phases of the 
mission or when Earth-pointing was required for experimentation periods. The Z-LV(R) 
attitude was defined as the -Z-axis pointing toward the Earth along the local vertical (nadir) 
with the X-axis in the orbital plane and opposite the velocity vector. The Z-LV(E) attitude was 
defined as the -Z control axis pointing toward the Earth along the local vertical (nadir) with the 
+X control axis in the orbital plane and pointing in the direction of the velocity vector. 
2. pcS. The PCS was a digitally implemented combination CMG momentum 
exchange and reaction jet control system. The system was designed to operate in unison with 
the CMG system providing the primary control capability and with the TACS providing 
assistance if the CMGs momentarily were unable to control the vehicle. The TACS could also 
operate as the primary control system. Attitude error and rate sensing were provided by two 
ASSs and nine RGs (three per axis). 
3. TACS. -The TACS was composed of six cold gas thrusters and the necessary logic 
to select and fire the proper thruster. The TACS control law provided thruster firing commands 
to null out attitude and rate errors when control deadbands were exceeded. 
The TACS was also used for CMG momentum desaturation as needed. Two thrusters 
provided uncoupled Y-axis control, and four thrusters provided coupled X- and Z-axis control. 
\Tyo types of thruster firings were commanded, minimum impulse bit (MIB) and full-on firing 
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time. For full-on firings the selected thruster was fired continuously for at least 1 s .  The MIB 
firming time was selectable from 40 to 400 ms to compensate for pressure decreases in the 
TAGS cold gas supply tanks. At the beginning of the mission a thruster produced 440 N (1 00 
lbf). This decreased to approximately 44N (1 0 lbf) at the end of the mission. 
4. CMG Control System. The CMG system was composed of three orthogonally 
mounted, double-gimbaled CMGs with a stored momentum capability of approximately 3000 
Nern-s (2200 ft-lb-s), as shown in Figure 3. 
t *" OUTER GlMBAL TORQUER 
Figure 3. CMG orientations. 
The CMG control law utilized three normalized torque commands and the CMG 
momentum status to generate proper CMG gimbal rate commands [ 5 ] .  The control law 
consisted of three parts: the steering law, the rotation law, and a gimbal stop avoidance law. 
Other routines were included for specialized situations. 
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The steering law provided torques on the vehicle either for attitude maneuvers or to 
oppose torques from gravity gradient, vehicle vents, or crew disturbances. Gimbal rate 
commands were generated in such a way that the torques resulting on the vehicle were identical 
to the desired torques in direction and magnitude. 
The rotation law attempted to minimize the probability of contact with the gimbal 
stops by reducing the largest gimbal angles. This was accomplished by rotation about thevector 
sums only. The total angular momentum was unaffected and no torque was exerted on the 
vehicle. 
A gimbal angle reset routine was incorporated into the CMG control law to allow the 
CMG system to recover from undesirable gimbal angle positions and/or momentum 
configuration. It also permitted initialization to any desirable momentum state. The TACS 
eliminated the difference in momentum between the initial and final momenta. 
Outer gimbal drive logic was provided during Z-LV maneuvers in order to force a 
desirable gimbal angle position. If it was sensed that a gimbal was moving in a direction 
opposite to the desired one, a momentary attitude perturbation was allowed and an open loop 
drive was executed to force the proper polarity. 
5 .  PCS Operation. All control was delegated to the CMG system as long as it was 
capable of maintaining the error signal within +20 deg. If the error signal exceeded 20 deg, 
TACS ONLY control was initiated. 
The Skylab used a four-parameter strapdown attitude navigation system consisting of 
RGs as inertial sensors and the ATMDC to calculate the strapdown algorithm. Two-axis sun 
sensors, a star tracker, and onboard analysis of the PCS response provided information to 
update the strapdown system. When an attitude error occurred, the CMG control law 
determined gimbal rate commands and the TACS control law determined the thruster firing 
commands. The CMG momentum status was monitored by the'flight program through the 
CMG direction cosine resolvers. 
A filter was incorporated in the CMG control law for each control axis. The purpose 
was to provide adequate stabilization and pointing of the rigid and flexible body dynamics. The 
control loop gains and filter coefficients were different for each axis. 
Maneuvers were accomplished by two different schemes: attitude biases and 
strapdown computations. Attitude biasing was used for solar offset (+4 deg) and for 
momentum desaturation maneuvers and was accomplished by biasing the attitude error signal 
with the desired offset angle, The other maneuvers required maneuvering the vehicle to 
arbitrary time variant or inertial attitudes and were accomplished via strapdown commands. 
Large momentum changes in the CMG system were generally required to provide the desired 
maneuver rates. 
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6. Digital Implementation. Digital implementation was accomplished using an 
ATMDC and WCIU. The flight program was responsible for operating modes, Skylab attitude 
reference, navigation and timing, CMG control law, TACS control law, maneuvering, 
automatic redundancy management, function command, data display, telemetry, and 
experiment support. The ATMDC flight program was modular in design. Most attitude control 
functions were performed at the rate of five times per second, and the remaining functions 
were performed once per second. 
7. CMG Momentum Management. Noncyclic disturbance torques would result in a 
net angular momentum buildup of the CMGs. Because of finite storage capacity of the CMGs, 
this momentum accumulation would eventually cause CMG saturation and loss of attitude 
control. To preclude this possibility and minimize the effects of noncyclic gravity gradient 
torques, the principal X-axis was maintained close to the orbital plane and momentum 
desaturation maneuvers were performed periodically during the night portion of the orbit [ 81 . 
The magnitude of the desaturation maneuvers was based on factors obtained by sampling 
normalized components of the total system (vehicle and CMGs) momentum four times during 
the day portion of the orbit. 
8. Experiment Pointing Control System. The EPCS was used for pointing control of 
the ATM experiment package. It provided automatic stabilization of the experiment package 
about the X- and Y-axis. The FSS and RG sensors mounted on the canister supplied position 
and rate feedback to the EPEA. The EPEA contained the electronic functions to command the 
flex-pivot actuators, closing the control loop. The EPCS did not perform Z-axis stabilization. 
Manual positioning about all three axes was provided for offset/roll pointing of the 
experiment package. X- and Y-axis offset pointing were achieved by means of a rotating optical 
wedge mechanism within the FSS. Offset commands could be issued from the manual pointing 
controller (MPC) or from the ATMDC. The roll position mechanism (RPM) was activated by 
command switches located on the C&D panel and on the ATM extravehicular activity (EVA) 
rotation control panel. All offset/roll commands were processed by the EPEA. A roll about 
line-of-sight capability was controlled by the ATMDC, utilizing the ATMDC wedge dri% 
capability. The EPEA also provided an interface between the star tracker and MPC, for manual 
positioning of the star tracker gimbals. Other EPC and EPC-related functions were canister 
caging control, experiment alignment calibration, and experiment and FSS door control 
(see Figure 2) .  
9. Redundancy Management. All mission-critical single-point failures were 
eliminated. System redundancy was provided so that any component failure that could cause 
the mission to be aborted or preclude mission objectives was provided with a backup unit or an 
alternate subsystem configuration that could be selected without performance degradation. 
Hardware redundancy included the following items: nine RGs (three per axis), two ASSs (two 
channels per axis), three CMGs (two required for control), two ATMDC/WCIU units, two 
TACS thruster modules with quad-redundant solenoid valves, two FSSs (two channels per 
axis), two CMG input assemblies (CMGIAs), four canister RGs (two per axis), EPEA with five 
redundant channels individually selected, four canister torque motors (two per axis), and 
redundant power sources. 
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The redundancy management philosophy was that primary APCS mission critical 
systems, those related to system performance or crew safety, would be 
managed automatically, utilizing the flight- program 
capability. Capability existed to inhibit all or portions of th 
The less critical systems were monitored manually by 
by ground support using the telemetry link. Manual 
capability existed via a switch selector and was commande 
integrity of the flight program, an ATMDC self-check capability was included. 
To increase the probability of completing the S 
to provide the means of loading the computer during flight. In addition to the regular 16k 
program, a skeleton 8k program capable of fitting either of the two 8k ATMDC memory 
modules located in each ATMDC was provided. 
10. Strapdown and Maneuvers. Studies of the WACS showed that an all-attitude 
capability for the attitude navigation, maneuver, and control schemes was required. Long lead 
time,hardwa-re purchased for the ATM, such as Sun sensors and RG packages, could easily be 
adapted for use in a strapdown attitude navigation system. A software strapdown algorithm, 
employing quaternions used in mission analysis simulations, met the requirements of the 
Skylab mission because the algorithm used rate inputs and had no singularities. Quaternions 
were also used in software to calculate the maneuvers to be performed by Skylab. 
iv. OPE~ATION 
A. Mission and Performance Description 
1. Planned Mission. The planned mission sequence was to place the unmanned 
Skylab, without the CSM, into a near-cii-cular, 435 km orbit with a nominal inclination of 50 
deg by a two-stage Saturn V launch vehicle. Within the 7.5 hr of the Saturn Instrument Unit 
lifetime, the ATM rack was to be oriented toward the sun, and the solar panels were to be 
deployed. The Skylab interior would then be pressurized to make it habitable for the crew. 
Approximately one day later the CSM, carrying a three-man crew, was to be placed into a 
temporary 150 by 222 km orbit by a Saturn IB launch vehicle. Using its own propulsion 
system, the CSM would achieve a rendezvous with Skylab and dock to an axial docking port. It 
was planned for the crew to remain on board Skylab for 28 days to conduct experiments. They 
then would prepare Skylab for orbital storage and return to Earth in the CSM. Two subsequent 
launches, similar to the second launch, were planned. Manned mission durations of no more 
than 56 days were anticipated. The first two flights were planned for the last quarter in 
1972. 
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2. Actual Mission. When the flight mission was actually initiated on May 14,1973, 
all did not go as planned. The micrometeoroid/thermal shield and one of two solar wings on the 
OWS were torn off during boost. The other workshop solar wing was deployed only 10 deg and 
generated no useful power. Fortunately the ATM and its associated solar wings were deployed 
and activated as planned. Skylab was in trouble, however, since it was able to generate only half 
of its designed electrical power and was without a thermal shield. To further complicate 
matters the immediate solutions to the thermal heating and electrical generation problems 
were contradictory. Electrically a sun incident angle of 90 deg was desired while thermally 
something less than 45 deg was preferred. This required a change in the Skylab nominal 
attitude, during its initial unmanned phase. 
Stability, arc min per 25 min 
Jitter, arc min (worst case excursion) 
After the initial thermal problems were overcome, the basic mission was altered in 
three significant ways. First, observation of the comet Kohoutek demanded unplanned 
flexibility in the mission. Second, the scope and duration of Earth resources experiments were 
expanded. Third, the total mission duration was extended from the original three Skylab 
manned operational periods of 28-56-56 days to 28-60-85 days to take advantage of expanded 
mission requirements. 
X Y Z 
1.8 0.5 0.5 
k 0.6 If: 0.45 If: 0.5 
The performance of the APCS was well within the system design specifications as given 
in Table 1. In the first portion of the second manned mission, as the requirements for the 
observation of comet Kohoutek evolved, a special interest focused on how well the PCS could 
point the vehicle. To determine the pointing accuracy of the CMG control subsystem, a special 
test was conducted in orbit utilizing one of the experiment cameras. The results of the test are 
shown in Table 2 and are well within the design requirements. 
3. Mission Support Team. An MSFC mission support team for the APCS (STAC) was 
organized to provide real time support for Johnson Space Center (JSC). This support was to 
provide direction, answer questions, and analyze and solve problems that occurred. The team 
would receive problems or questions from the operations director (OD) in the Huntsville 
Operations Support Center (HOSC). STAC would then obtain answers from the proper 
support group or groups, coordinate the answers, and furnish a reply to the flight operations 
mission room (FOMR) through the OD at HOSC. ’ 
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The original plan was to have two complete APCS teams. Each team consisted of a 
specialist in his field plus additional personnel to cover other contingencies. Each team was to 
be alternately on call for 24 hours. Because of the system and operational problems, the 
planned two teams had to be expanded to fivehteams to meet the continuous support required. 
A prime factor in providing support for the APCS team was having adequate data. Six 
data sources were utilized by the team: real-time telemetry displays, digital television displays, 
limited viewing of JSC digital television formats, off-line telemetry tape processing by IBM, 
computer plots and tabulations from the Mission Operation Planning System (MOPS), and 
hard copies in the form of data books. 
The APCS team was assigned a work room in HOSC. This room contained a TV 
monitor and communication lines to JSC , in addition to normal telephone communications. 
This room was too small to adequately house the APCS team so remote sites having various 
capabilities were utilized. IBM provided support in the areas of ATMDC software and 
hardware, data reduction, and maneuver simulations. Other system hardware was monitored 
and evaluated by the Real Time Astrionics Problem Solving Support Team. The Hardware 
Simulation Laboratory was used to verify flight programs and patches, develop procedures, 
examine hardware problems, and test some of the replacement hardware sent aloft with the 
second Skylab crew. Most of the simulations of maneuvers were performed on the Marshall 
Hybrid Simulation (EA1 8900). Support from Bendix Research Laboratories, Detroit, and 
Martin Marietta, Denver, was obtained in solving long range problems. 
STAC spent several months practicing mission support. The first practices were used to 
acquaint the team personnel with communications, procedures, reference documents, and the 
coordination aspects of problems. Problems or contingency situations requiring solutions were 
used in the final practices. These practices involved the full team including various simulators 
to arrive at solutions to the problems. 
B. Major Variations from Expected Operations [ 12 - 141 
1. Thermal Attitude. On May 14,1973, at 1730 GMT the unmanned Skylab Orbital 
Workshop was launched from Kennedy Space Center. Prelaunch tests and the countdown 
demonstration prior to the final countdown went very smoothly. At 63 seconds after lift-off, 
an unexpected telemetry indication of micrometeoroid/thermal shield deployment and 
separation of the solar array wing No. 2 beam firing was received. However, all other space 
vehicle systems appeared normal and the OWS was inserted into a near-circular Earth orbit of 
approximately 435 km altitude. The payload shroud was jettisoned and the ATM and its solar 
wings were deployed as planned during the first orbit. Deployment of the OWS solar wings and 
the micrometeoroid/thermal shield was unsuccessful. 'Evaluatip of the available data 
indicated loss of the shield. Telemetry data also indicated that at about the time the solid 
rocket motors fired to decelerate the second stage, one of the solar wings was lost from the 
OWS. The remaining solar wing was released; however, there were indications that the wing was 
deployed only about 10 deg. An abnormal temperature rise in the OWS was observed and 
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attributed to the absence of the micrometeoroid/thermal shield. In the SI attitude, with the 
plane of the solar wings normal to the sun for maximum electric power generation, the OWS 
temperature finally exceeded its operating limit. In order to bring this temperature to within 
design limits, the OWS was rotated about the Y-axis by 45 deg from the sun 13 hours after 
launch to reduce the solar incidence angle and heat influx on the OWS. However, this attitude 
further reduced the power generation capability which had already been severely limited by 
the loss of the OWS solar array wing No. 2 and the failure of wing No. 1 to deploy. A continuing 
adjustment of attitude was necessary to keep the power and tempe res within acceptable 
limits. Temperatures and electrical measurements were used to u 
computations since there was no ASS information in this attitude. Constraints 
adequate heat in other critical areas of the workshop and to optimize 
APCS in an off-nominal mode added further complications. This delicate balance continued 
for approximately 10 days. 
The electrical power available from the ATM solar wings (one-half of the total design 
capability) was decreased by the requirement to cycle certain power regulator modules on and 
off to prevent overheating caused by these unplanned vehicle attitudes. Although considerably 
below the total design capability of approximately 8500 watts, the power was sufficient for the 
critical vehicle loads. Many components and systems were turned off or were cycled as required 
to remain within the power generation capability. Maneuvering into and out of the various 
thermal control attitudes caused a much larger usage of TACS impulse than predicted. 
Sufficient propellant remained, however; for the three planned manned missions. 
The launch of the first manned mission was delayed 10 days. In the 1Oday period 
teams across the country accomplished the design, manufacture, test, and delivery to the 
launch site of four hardware systems intended to combat the temperature problem - an effort 
which under normal circumstances would have taken months at best. Three of the systems - 
one, a parasol to be deployed through a scientific airlock - were selected for flight and were 
stowed on board the CSM with other hardware for freeing the undeployed solar wing and 
replacements for the supplies expected to be affected by the abnormally high workshop 
temperature. 
The first crew arrived at Skylab on May 25. Visual inspection from the CSM confirmed 
that the micrometeoroid/thermal shield and one of the OWS solar wings were missing. The 
astronauts also reported that the remaining solar wing was only partially deployed, seemingly 
held in that position by a metal strip from the shield. Television transmission enabled engineers 
on the ground to study the situation. After an unsuccessful attempt to free the solar wing, the 
crew docked and entered Skylab. They successfully deployed the parasol through the scientific 
airlock facing the sun and then activated the systems. With the parasol shading part of the area 
of the OWS and with the return to the normal SI attitude, the OWS temperature decreased over 
a period of several days from 55°C to 25OC (13 1°F to 77OF). The crew then established the 
OWS manning routine and for the next 1 1 days performed scientific and medical experiments 
under a reduced power profile. During a 3.5-hour EVA on mission day 13, the Commander and 
Science Pilot freed and deployed the partially extended OWS solar wing. Adequate power 
was then available, permitting a return to the original flight plan. 
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The return of systems to a powered-up mode and crew operations to near normal gave 
rise to hopes for an uneventful continuation of the mission. However, the early exposure of 
systems and components to attitudes and environments exceeding design limitations was to 
continue to plague the mission. The perseverance and ingenuity of dedicated mission control 
and supporting engineering personnel, together with the perseverance and dedication of the 
flight crews, would lead to the solution of each new and separate problem and would allow the 
Skylab mission to continue. 
2. Rate Gyro Problems. Within the first 21-hours of APCS operation, failures of either 
telemetry measuring circuits or heater control circuits were evident on four rack RG packages 
(RGPs). Later in the mission, an additional rack RGP and one EPCS RGP showed identical 
symptoms. After detailed studies it was concluded that the six RGPs had experienced heater 
control failures causing them to overheat. All the hot RGPs showed much noiser outputs than 
the normal RGPs. Another prdblem noted with the hot RGPs was a change in scale factor. This 
caused redundancy management rate integral discompares during maneuvers. It was possible to 
compensate in the ATMDC software for scale factor errors only in the Y-axis. Ultimately, 
through extensive analyses and test, the cause was proven to be a design deficiency. Use of a 
fiber washer, which took a permanent set when subjected to thermal cycling, allowed loosening 
of the power switching transistor mounting system, causing the transistor to thermally saturate 
and hold the RG heaters in the “on” position. 
The second major RG problem was a drift anomaly. Excessive RGP drift rates first 
became evident shortly after switchover to ATMDC control. Drift rates as high as 18 deg/hr 
were noted. The high drift rates made it difficult to maintain the correct attitude for thermal 
control during the first 10 days. Constant drift rates could be compensated for by ground 
command to the ATMDC. However, the drift rates changed suddenly and caused difficulty 
until the new rates could be measured and compensated for. As time passed in the mission, the 
magnitude of the drift rate changes decreased. Eventually, at least one RGPin each axis became 
stable and was used through the remainder of the mission. After considerable investigation it 
was established that the high drift rates were caused by gas bubbles in the RG flotation fluid. 
A design deficiency exposed the float chamber bellows to the hard vacuum of space, 
releasing entrapped gases present in the flotation fluid. The decrease in drift rates as the mission 
progressed was attributed to either reabsorption of the gas by the flotation fluid or relocation 
of the bubbles in the float chamber due to float fluid agitation. 
As the mission progressed, degradation was seen in the operation of some of the hot 
RGs. Two of the Y-axis RGs had shown full scale oscillation, and a Z-axis RG had failed hard 
over. Additionally another Z- and X-axis RG would also act up occasionally. By the time the 
first crew returned, the seriousness of the problem had become apparent. The loss of another 
Y-axis RG would have meant the end of Skylab and the other axes did not look much better. 
More RGs were needed, but the existing ones could not be replaced because of their 
inaccessibility (within the ATM rack). It was decided that an orthogonal platform with six RGs 
(two in each axis) would be packaged together (termed a six-pack) and then mounted interior 
15 
to the Skylab in close alignment to the original rack RGs. The package was carried up by the 
second crew and was connected to the system during an EVA. Mating of four electrical 
connectors was required, one of which was critical. Failure to reconnect this 
most likely have meant mission termination since all RGP signals fed into the 
this connector. During the installation time, no attitude control was possib 
was permitted to drift. No problems were encountered. The six-pack RGs 
single power source. To avoid an undetectable single point failure, one R 
each axis was paired with the best original rack RG. The operation o f t  
installation was excellent, and there were no more significant RG probl 
of the mission. 
3. CMG Anomalies and Failures. No redundancy of the CMG wheel speed 
measurement was provided, since the speed indication was for display only. Twelve days after 
launch the indicated wheel speed of CMG No. 3 went from nominal to zero within 1 s. The spin 
motor currents and the bearing temperatures remained nominal. This indicated a failure of the 
speed sensor; this was supported by the fact that the APCS continued to perform normally. 
Later in the mission there also were several erratic indications in the speed measurement of 
CMG No. 2 which appeared to be self-correcting. The CMGs operated normally until the nineth 
day into the third manned mission when, upon site acquisition, telemetry indicated zero wheel 
speed and a significantly overheated spin bearing on CMG No. 1. The spin motor currents were 
about twice normal, and the RGs mounted in the vicinity of the CMGs were very noisy, but the 
bearing temperature was decreasing. None of the CMG automatic shutdown levels had been 
reached. There was no loss of attitude control, and the ATMDC was in normal three-CMG 
control. After several minutes of analysis the mission control team declared that CMG No. 1 
had failed and commanded that the electric brake be applied. This cut the power to the CMG 
and forced the ATMDC to reconfigure to two-CMG operation. Subsequent evaluation of the 
data showed that the difficulty started with the beginning of the second momentum 
desaturation maneuver. The maneuvers, however, were relatively small and had been 
successfuly completed by the time telemetry was reacquired. 
The probable cause for CMG No. 1 failure was lubrication starvation of one of the spin 
bearings. However, it was difficult to reconstruct the events just before the failure, since full 
telemetry was available only when the vehicle was over a ground station. Momentum 
indications were that the wheel had spun down within an hour, which was very fast when 
compared with the braked spindown time of about 5.5 hr and the coast-down time of over 15 
hr. Further investigation revealed that the spin bearing had been in distress on four occasions 
before the final failure. The distresses seemed to be linked to low bearing temperature (before 
the heater came on) and to high gimbal rate demands (for maneuvering). They were 
characterized by above nominal wheel spin motor currents, an abnormal bearing temperature, 
and a drop in wheel speed. The bearing distresses before final failure had been ignored since 
their significance was not recognized. Because another CMG failure would have severely 
curtailed the mission, everyone concerned was very sensitive to bearing distresses on the two 
remaining CMGs. CMG No. 3 did not show any distresses, but one spin bearing of CMG No. 2 
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showed an ever increasing number, coupled with an increase in severity. It was obviously only a 
matter of time before CMG No. 2 would also fail. Relief was attempted by cancelling large 
maneuvers when)CMG No. 2 was in distress, by reducing the maximum possible gimbal rate 
during the desaturation maneuvers from 4 deg/s to 2 deg/s (via a patch in the ATDMC), and by 
manually managing the bearing heater operation to avoid low bearing temperatures. While it 
cannot be proven, it is still felt that these measures prolonged the life of CMG No. 2 until the 
end of the mission. 
4. Star Tracker Operation and Failure. A gimbaled star tracker was used to provide 
experimenters with knowledge of vehicle roll attitude about the sunline to within 10 arc min. 
For the first manned mission, the normal operating plan was to provide continuous roll 
reference information from the star tracker except for occultation periods. Frequently a 
particle of contamination came into the field-of-view, and the tracker began tracking the 
particle. This destroyed the experimenters’ knowledge of roll reference, and the crew had to 
drop what they were doing to reposition the star tracker gimbals to reacquire the star. 
Contamination tracking could have been avoided by a gimbal angle reasonableness test. 
A different operating procedure was used during the second mission to minimize the 
problem of contamination. Normally the tracker was placed in a standby configuration, and 
periodically the crew would operate the tracker until the star was acquired and the computer 
had received the gimbal information. Then the tracker was switched back to standby. The 
tracker worked well with this procedure except for five occasions when the shutter stuck in the 
open position. On each occasion the shutter would recover, usually within several hours. 
Realizing the possibility of detector degradation after the first shutter failure, the crew was 
asked to position the tracker to look at a dark surface of the vehicle when the shutter was failed 
in the open position. Unfortunately, the tracker had been degraded by 30 percent to 50 
percent (probably by Earth albedo) when the shutter had first failed in the open position. One 
of the consequences of this periodic star tracker operation was that the software which 
provided canister roll reference calculations and telemetry did not have the accuracy required 
by the experimenters. A software patch to provide better calculations of roll reference was 
implemented for the third manned mission. An extensive data reduction process was initiated 
to recover more accurate roll reference information prior to the patch. 
The tracker suffered catastrophic failure 42 days into the third manned mission. The 
outer gimbal position indicator suddenly went to zero. Analysis indicated that the optical 
encoder had failed. As a backup, periodic sextant star sightings were obtained from the CSM 
to update the roll reference. This procedure was time consuming but the improved 
performance of the strapdown system operating with the six-pack RGs allowed the system 
to operate without updating for long periods of time. 
5. Astronaut Suit Vent. No special treatment was originally planned for the EVA 
activities as far as the APCS was concerned. The hatch vent torque would be absorbed by the 
CMGs and the momentum desaturation scheme would dump the accumulated momentum 
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during the next orbital night. However, the so-called nonpropulsive astronaut suit vent had 
been covered by a flap to avoid contamination of the ATM instruments during EVA. As a 
consequence relatively large disturbance torques were experienced - large enough to saturate 
the CMG momentum and cause TACS firings as well as gimbal stop problems during 
momentum desaturation maneuvers. This resulted in the activation of the CMG gimbal reset 
with more TACS firings. Since the astronaut orientation during the EVA was 
and since the gimbal reset (which used much TACS fuel) was always possible, it was better to 
inhibit momentum desaturation with CMGs and desaturate with TACS directly. This was the 
policy until the failure of CMG No. 1, which aggravated the stop problems. For two-CMG 
operation the CMGs were subsequently electrically caged to  the nominal momentum profile 
during EVA, thereby absorbing most of the gravity gradient torques. The TACS was put in 
control to maintain the vehicle within its attitude deadband. Although this method always cost 
TACS fuel, it avoided the penalty of higher TACS cost that would result from loss of CMG 
attitude control with attendant automatic switchover to TACS control. 
6. Experiment Maneuvers. In the 50 days between the second and third manned 
missions, Skylab systems were analyzed to determine the best way to take advantage of the 
appearance of a comet (Kohoutek) which would pass close to the Sun on December 27. A 
decision was made to slip the launch of the last crew 3 weeks so that comet perihelion would 
occur midway into the manned mission. The comet was to be photographed (by cameras 
mounted in the OWS) during its approach to and departure from our solar system. This 
photography required maneuvers to bring the comet within range of an articulated mirror 
system used with the cameras. The mirror had to be shaded from the Sun so that stray light 
would not enter the camera. To do this, computations were performed on tbe ground to 
maneuver the vehicle so that one of the ATM solar wings shaded the mirror. At the same time, 
the X principal axis had to remain in the orbital plane to prevent a buildup of momentum. 
When the comet approached the sun to within an angle of approximately 5 deg, the sensitive 
ATM experiments were used to obtain analysis of the comet structure in various wavelengths. 
To provide for these new maneuver requirements, the digital computer was reprogramed to 
reduce the size of the smallest attitude bias command from 0.1 deg to 0.01 deg. The largest 
allowable SI attitude bias was also increased from 4.00 deg to 5.25 deg to increase the 
opportunity to use the Sun as an attitude reference while pointing the ATM to the comet. 
Many other types of maneuvers were performed by Skylab for gathering scientific data. 
Earth resources maneuvers were required to point the experiments to the Earth. These same 
experiments required periodic calibration by slewing them across the Moon. ATM experiments 
were pointed, in an open loop fashion, to several different celestial objects using the strapdown 
system as an inertial reference. There were 60 Earth resources maneuvers planned, 94 were 
performed; 3 rendezvous maneuvers were planned, none were performed; no comet 
maneuvers were planned, 59 were performed; and no celestial object maneuvers were planned, 
4 were performed. 
7. ATMDC Patches. Prior to Skylab launch a number of contingency situations were 
identified and 24 software patches were developed as solutions. Some of these patches were 
used to solve problems as they arose. Fourteen were implemented during the Skylab mission. 
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The ability to modify or patch the existing flight program proved to be mission-essential. This 
capability also made it possible to support the new program objectives related to comet 
Mohoutek. 
8. Early in the fust manned mission, the 
ild motions on RG telemetry, as shown in became con 
was asked what they were doing, they said they were jog 
the circumference of Skylab, similar to a squirrel in a rev0 
able to maintain upright positions. This exercise on the 
crew motion disturbance experienced by the APCS. As a of exercise was 
'prohibited thereafter. Figure 4 also shows more routine 
and wake periods. In all cases the EPCS maintained acceptable solar pointing. With normal 
levels of crew motion disturbance the crewmen estimated that the EPCS jitter was less than 1 
arc sec. Further, experimenters have been very pleased with the quality of photographs taken 
of the Sun. 
l lm in  20 min 
CREW JOGGING CREW AWAKE CREW ASLEEP 
Figure 4. Jitter caused by crew motion. 
9. EPC-Derived Rate Control Assembly. Following the loss of the EPC primary 
up/down (UP/DN) RG and in view of the overall problems experienced with the Skylab RG 
processors, it was felt that there was a significant possibility that the secondary UP/DN RG 
would fail. The EPC was equipped with two RGs per axis, so a second UP/DN RG failure would 
have terminated use of the EPC. Replacing or supplementing the EPC RG system, such as had 
been done in the CMGlTACS system, was not considered feasible. Subsequently, a device 
called the EPC derived rate control assembly was designed. It was to be inserted in se&s with 
the FSS output for the purpose of producing a pseudo-rate signal to stabilize the EPC system in 
lieu of using signals from the canister RGs. The device was never installed, however, because no 
further EPC RG failures occurred. 
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10. Post Mission Tests. After completion of the last manned mission, CMG No. 1 
(which had failed earlier in the mission) was turned on to see if it would run. Power was applied 
to the wheel for 8.5 hr. From the currents it was concluded that the spin motor torque 
0.13 Nom (about 18 in.-oz) did not overcome the bearing friction and the wheel did no 
End-of-mission testing was also conducted on 
bearing torque was calculated to be 0.034 Nom (4.8 in.-o 
is within the range of torque for normal bearings. This 
had been incurred by the bearings. It was felt that the 
that the problems observed were due to retainer ring instability because of insufficient 
lubricant in the bearing raceways and the retainer ring. 
After the final crew had departed and the control system was deactivated, a 16k 
program was loaded successfully from the tape in the MLU tape recorder. After a short interval 
to verify that the program was functioning, a 16k program was loaded successfully from the 
ground. This marked the first time an in-flight computer had been loaded in total from the 
ground by RF uplink. 
On February 8, 1974, the Skylab vehicle was maneuvered to its storage attitude. In this 
attitude the +X principal axis lies along the gravity gradient vector in a direction away from the 
Earth with the +Z principal axis lying along the vehicle’s negative velocity vector. Ground 
tracking indications are that the vehicle is stable in this attitude. 
6. I mprovements/Lessons Learned 
1. CMG Rotation Law. The CMG rotation law operated as desired for three CMGs 
with the docked (manned) configuration. A modification to the rotation law giving the largest 
gimbal angle the proper weight, while sty1 allowing a compromise between it and the next 
smaller gimbal angle, would have been preferable to the linear addition used [SI. The stop 
problem could have been softened if the freedom of the outer gimbal stop could have been 
increased from 350 deg (stop to stop) to at least 450 deg. This change had been requested, but 
development of the long lead time hardware items was too far advanced to implement the 
change. Of course thevery best solution is the complete elimination of at least the outer gimbal 
stop (the inner is of much smaller importance). On Skylab the analysis of the stop problem cost 
an immense amount of manpower, computer time, and at least 2 years rc dwelopment effort. 
Without stops the ATMDC memory requirements for the implementation of the CMG control 
laws could have been cut considerably by PlkLiation of the rotation law and the outer gimbal 
drive logic and by simplification of the ginibal reset routine. 
2. Attitude Error Limiting. The maximum CMG momentum envelope is a sphere. 
This matches well the attitude error generation method using quaternions, which treats all 
directions in space equally. The CMG torque command is limited only in magnitude by 
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proportionally scaling the components. This philosophy was not followed in determining the 
limits on the attitude errors. Because the control gain about the X-axis was seven times smaller 
than about the Y- and Z-axis, there was a significant difference in the attitude error 
limits. As a consequence the torque command vector direction changed drastically when a 
limit was reached. Any time the X-momentum was larger than about 1220 N*m*s (900 
ft-lb-s), the CMGs were saturated, and all attitude errors were on their limits, the 
additional momentum then would be drawn out of the X-axis which, due to its small 
inertia, resulted in a relatively large X vehicle rate and a large attitude excursion. These 
forced a switchover to the TACS-only mode with the associated large TACS fuel 
consumption (due to relatively high vehicle rates enforced by the TACS logic when 
reducing the attitude error to zero). The hard attitude error limiting precluded the large 
X attitude error having any effect. A proportional limit on the attitbde error would have 
eliminated the problem. Two conditions were required for the problem to manifest itself. 
Momentum desaturation maneuvers (the regular maneuver scheme used rates only) had to 
be in progress, and the momentum prediction inherent in the desaturation scheme had to  
be wrong. This happened once because of an RG integral test failure and once because of 
excessive and varying astronaut suit vents during EVA. The problem was minimized by 
carefully managing the system, such as by &hibiting the momentum desaturation during 
later EVAs. 
3. Finer Resolution of Attitude Error. Jitter amplitude is a function of the 
quantization of the attitude error. When the APCS was in the SI mode, the full precision of the 
strapdown algorithm was applied to the attitude error. In the attitude hold mode, the attitude 
error was calculated by quaternion multiplication. The multiplication was done in single 
precision which limited the resolution to 25 arc sec, whereas the resolution of the attitude error 
from the strapdown algorithm was about 0.1 arc sec. Figure 5 shows a comparison of the jitter 
obtained from the attitude hold and SI modes. 
- 
I 
-I 1-1/2min -f ’ ’ 1- 4-1/2mm ATTITUDE HOLD SOLAR INERTIAL 
MODE JITTER MODE JITTER 
Figure 5. Attitude error jitter. 
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To improve the jitter during the comet and X-ray star maneuvers, a special procedure 
was used to make the computer use the SI mode logic while pointing at the target. This was 
accomplished by initializing the strapdown aft 
the SI mode with the sun sensor powered down. 
best jitter available while preventing the sun sens 
4. 
used to mo 
should be expanded in future space vehicles. A digital 
complex experiment setup procedures which would free 
functions of data gathering and interpretation. Skylab demonstrated the need for flexibility in 
program alteration for large digital control computers. A lesson learned from the Skylab 
mission was that having fully digital control systems for spacecraft is an attractive design 
concept. 
5. Integral Control Law. A large part of the pointing error observed during the stellar 
X-ray pointing experiment and the comet Kohoutek pointing could have been eliminated by 
using an integral control law. The gravity gradient torques cause a pointing error and this error 
can be nulled by an integral control law. Such a law was developed and a flight computer patch 
was designed. The software failed to provide the predicted improvement during ground 
verification so it was not implemented. Nonoptimum scaling of the fixed point calculations 
was probably the reason for the failure. 
6 .  Design Requirements and the Actual Mission. Design requirements 2nd guidelines 
are obviously necessary, but the Skylab mission showed these should be considered to be the 
minimum design. If at all possible more capability or flexibility should be designed into the 
systems. The following examples will illustrate the point. 
Including docking failures and two-CMG operation, the predicted TACS impulse usage 
was 160 kN-s (36 000 lb-s) for the life of the Skylab. The vehicle was loaded at launch with 
about 375 kN*s (84 000 lb-s) or 235 percent of the predicted (“design”) usage. This was 
fortunate since 190 kN*s (43 000 lb-s) or about 120 percent of the predicted usage was used 
during the first 2 weeks in maintaining the thermal attitude. In this attitude the momentum 
desaturation scheme could not work and desaturation had to be made via the CMG gimbal reset 
with the associated high impulse usage. This usage would have been even higher had the ground 
support team not been able to develop a backup method to keep the X-principal axis close to 
the orbital plane. A large portion of the TACS fuel used during the mission can be identified as 
having been used under anomalous operation conditions. However, the TACS usage during 
nominal operation is consistent with preflight predictions. TACS usage during EVAs proved to 
be higher than expected as a consequence of the astronaut suitvents. 
t 
During the last manned mission, TACS expenditures rose following the CMG No. 1 
failure. Decreased CMG momentum capability coupled with increased maneuver requirements, 
especially for comet Kohoutek observation, placed an added burden on the TACS budget. 
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Mission planners had to minimize TACS usage while allowing full experiment operation. The 
most significant conservation technique proved to be the orbital noon-to-noon earth resources 
experiments (EREP) pass. 
Pointing the ATM at targets other than the Sun was never specified; but, since it was 
feasible with the onboard maneuvering scheme, ATM was not only pointed at comet Kohoutek 
but also at Mercury (to verify comet Kohoutek pointing capability) at at various stellar X-ray 
sources. Special maneuvers to point the EREP package at the Moon for calibration were also 
made. This off-solar pointing required new computer programs on the ground to generate the 
maneuver angles to point at the target while keeping the X-principal axis in the orbital plane 
when required to minimize momentum accumulation. 
The momentum desaturation scheme used the orbital plane angle (the angle about the 
sun line by which the vehicle X-axis was rotated out of the orbital plane) for the desaturation 
maneuver calculations. The star tracker, when active, supplied this angle. When not active, its 
last output was utilized for the six subsequent orbits, adjusted by the changes the desaturation 
scheme commanded about the sun line. This method assumed that the star tracker was locked 
onto a star and that the RG drift was nominal. When the star tracker was inactive for long 
periods, the desaturation scheme used a calculated orbital plane angle based on the estimated 
inertia properties of the vehicle. As it turned out the star tracker tracked contamination 
particles several times during the mission. During tracking of particles the indicated orbital 
plane angle error often was quite large, but the desaturation scheme was flexible enough that 
the performance degraded only when the error exceeded IO deg. The assumption of reasonable 
RG drift was severely violated until the installation of the six-pack RGP by the second crew. 
The programed inertial parameters, the direction of the principal axes, and the calculation of 
the orbital plane angle were in error due to the loss of the micrometeroid/thermal shield and 
one solar wing. In spite of this, the desaturation scheme worked well. The errors were 
eventually corrected by patching the ATMDC software. 
The attitude control law and CMG control law combination could accommodate a 
large deviation of the actual CMG momentum magnitude while assuming that it was at its 
nominal value. This was demonstrated when attitude control was not impaired when CMG No. 
1 failed. Control system performance appeared normal, and the ATMDC redundancy 
management had not realized that anything was wrong. Therefore, action from the ground had 
to initiate two-CMG operation. 
The switchover was very smooth without any attitude disturbance (a large maneuver 
with a failed CMG would have shown that something was wrong, but only small desaturation 
maneuvers were in progress at the time). 
7. APCS Simulations. Many simulations (about 20) were used in the APCS design 
and development. Due to the planned length of the mission, it was not feasible to simulate the 
entire mission. Therefore the various simulations verified concepts and software at the normal 
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and extreme values. In addition, contingencies such as two-CMG operation were studied 
extensively. The speed range of these simulations varied from real time to lOOX real time 
depending on the speed of the computer and the complexity of the models. In general, those 
simulations concentrating on dynamic response utilized models with greater hardware detail 
and operated more slowly but did not require as long an examination period. The most 
complex and demanding areas to be simulated were those of TACS budgeting, momentum 
management, and maneuvering. The types of parameters that were varied included solar 
elevation, CMG configuration, and maneuver profiles. These studies had to be repeated many 
times in the development history, as simulations were updated to reflect changes in control 
concepts. After the momentum management laws had been finalized, computer outputs 
showing expected maneuver profiles were generated. 
While all simulations were very useful for the APCS development, only a very few 
proved useful for real-time mission support. One such simulation was the fast MSFC hybrid 
which was located in the same building as the HOSC. Its maximum capability of 1 OOX real time 
made j t  useful for mission support and as a backup to the momentum management program of 
the MOPS. It was available 24 hours a day and was used regularly to optimize the daily flight 
plan in order to minimize TACS usage and avoid dmbal stop problems during maneuvers. The 
studies became even more critical after the failure of CMG No. 1 and the resulting switch to 
two-CMG control where there was practically no momentum margin. [ 15 , 161 
8. Easier In-Orbit Maintenance. Certainly one of the lessons learned from Skylab 
was that a highly motivated crew can do a tremendous amount of in-orbit troubleshooting, 
maintenance, and repair, Le., thermal shield deployment, freeing the SWS solar wmg, six-pack 
RG installation, etc. Even more could have been done if the Skylab had been specifically 
designed with an in-orbit maintenance capability. Future spacecraft designers should keep this 
in mind, especially for vehicles that will be in space for long periods of time. 
9. Nomenclature and Coordinate Systems. Nomenclature and coordinate system 
definitions usually do not receive the proper attention very early in the definition phases of a 
program; this leads to unnecessary complications. The Skylab program was no exception. Early 
in the program the attitude control people noted that due to a lack in coordination the 
structures people had mounted the CMGs quite differently from what was intended. The 
structural designation was retained; this required the modification and reprogramming of 
several very involved hybrid and digital simulations. Rather awkward nomenclature had to be 
carried all the way through the mission since a simplification was not attempted early enough. 
The CMG gimbal angles had a subscript with four characters rather than the minimum of one. 
Two definitions of the solar elevation angle (qx = -0) were carried throughout the mission. One 
originated from a mathematically positive definition, the other from previous usage. The mass 
property coordinate system was rotated 180 deg from the guidance and control coordinate 
system, and all mass and inertia data had to be translated. 
The pitch, yaw, and roll nomenclature, while well defined for ships and craft, leads to 
much confusion when it is applied to a space vehicle like Skylab. Skylab consists of different 
parts, each with its own logical definition of pitch, yaw, and roll. For example, the X-axis 
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is roll for the OWS and the CSM, but the Z-axis is roll for the ATM experiment canister. 
Such nomenclature and definition problems should be avoided in future programs. 
10. Improved Ability to Measure Misalignments. Uncertainties in caging the EPCS 
were the probable causes of the failure to detect X-ray stars during the galactic X-ray 
experiment. Skylab was maneuvered to point the solar experiments to an X-ray star with the 
EPC system caged. In some instances the star tracker was used to detect errors in X-ray star 
pointing by making two other star sightings. The crew would take two other star sightings with 
the star tracker to determine where the experiments were pointed. Small bias maneuvers were 
then performed to reduce this error. Unfortunately, any play in the EPC caging mechanism 
caused a misalignment that went undetected by the star tracker because it was mounted on the 
vehicle. In one instance, the X-ray star also emitted visible light. One of the experiments, a 
white light (solar) coronagraph with a crew TV display, was used to observe the star location. 
Bias maneuvers were then made to point the star to the center of the field of view of the 
coronagraph. Because the coronagraph had an occulting disc in the center of its field of view, 
navigation errors had to be measured in the visible doughnut-shaped area. This scheme 
depended on the TV system being linear to within 1 or 2 percent. In postflight debriefing, the 
crew reported that the linearity was poor; this is the probable cause of failure to obtain data on 
the visible X-ray star. A lot of ground analysis and crew time was spent on this experiment. The 
inclusion of a fixed head star tracker would have allowed the EPCS loop to be closed 
around a star tracker, then the accuracy and stability required for the X-ray experiment 
could have been readily achieved. 
11. Ground Testing. The extent of the drift problem in the RG was not apparent 
from the tests performed. RG processor drift was not measured in vacuum until thermal 
vacuum tests were performed on the assembled ATM. Telemetry was used to monitor RG 
processor outputs, and a special preflight ATMDC program provided a gross check. The 
telemetry system had some noise, and the seismic vibration levels in the thermal vacuum 
chamber caused the RG outputs to be extremely noisy. Since the ground support equipment 
was programmed to monitor the RGs by comparing the outputs of the three RGs on each axis, 
the test had to be insensitive to drift because of the high noise levels. The preflight ATMDC 
program used a similar method to monitor the RGs. With this level of processing, two RGs were 
found to be drifting excessively and were replaced. The full extent of the RG drift probably 
could have been determined if the preflight program compared the integrals of the RG outputs, 
like the flight program, instead of comparing raw rates. The tests could have been made much 
more sensitive and perhaps the extremely erratic nature of the drift problem could have been 
determined. 
12. Attitude Determination. A lot of ground support effort could have been saved if 
solar aspects sensors had been provided, since the thermal attitude required operation for 
several days without an attitude reference update from the sun sensor. Other means of 
determining attitude with respect to the sun had to be found. A method of determining solar 
aspect by analyzing the OWS solar wing currents was perfected prior to the flight. However, 
one wing was lost during boost and the other could not be deployed. Experts from the power 
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and thermal areas were consulted and within hours several other backup attitude 
determination schemes were developed. Analysis of the outputs of the functional ATM solar 
wings provided a measure of the solar aspect cone angle to an accuracy of about 1 deg and the 
sun could be maintained in the vehicle X-Z plane by observing the output of the temperature 
transducers. This method was used for updating the strapdown reference system to account for 
the RG drifts during the major portion of the thermal attitude period. 
Another scheme for measuring cone angle was developed using a quartz crystal 
contamination monitoring instrument. This method was not as accurate as the scheme using 
the solar wings. A method was finally developed which determined vehicle attitude from the 
CMG momentum samples. This scheme could determine vehicle attitude with respect to the 
Earth in three axes and showed the most promise for emergency attitude determination. The 
momentum scheme was not available until the end of the thermal attitude period so it found 
little application until the star tracker failure occurred in the third manned mission. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Skylab was the first manned spacecraft to utilize large CMGs for momentum storage 
and attitude control, the first to utilize vehicle maneuvers for CMG momentum desaturation, 
the first to utilize a fully digital control system with in-orbit reprogramming capability and 
extensive automatic redundancy management, and the first to utilize an attitude reference 
system based on a four-parameter strapdown computation which allowed utilization of an 
all-attitude eigenaxis maneuvering scheme. 
During the mission, two of the nine original APCS RGs, the star tracker, one CMG, and 
one EPCS RG failed. Three additional APCS RGs were seriously degraded. However, sufficient 
built-in redundancy was available to accommodate all these failures while satisfying all 
pointing and maneuver requirements. Six additional RGs were taken into orbit and installed in 
the system by the second crew. This was done to provide additional capability in theevent of 
more RG failures. 
The APCS performed a central role in the survival of Skylab after loss of the 
micrometeoroid/thermal shield and one OWS solar wing. The built-in APCS flexibility allowed 
off-nominal vehicle attitude maneuvers to be performed for vehicle thermal control until a 
sunshade could be deployed by the first crew. Although these maneuvers required considerable 
TACS fuel, it was possible to complete the expanded 271-day mission and also to meet the 
additional maneuver requirements imposed by experiments to study the comet Kohoutek and 
perform stellar X-ray photography during the last mission. Skylab proved to be a major 
advancement in the state-of-the-art of orbital space vehicles [ 1 1 ] . 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama, November 1974 
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